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OPINION
         
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judge.
Congress has provided that aliens
“not lawfully admitted for permanent
res idence” w h o  co m m it  cer ta in
“aggravated” felonies are deportable under
expedited removal procedures.  8 U.S.C. §
1228(b).  Appellant Karim Bamba has
been convicted of an aggravated felony,
but argues in this habeas corpus appeal
that the expedited procedures do not apply
because he was not lawfully admitted at
all, but merely “paroled” into the United
States for a limited purpose.  For the
reasons elaborated below, we reject this
2argument and hold Bamba subject to
expedited removal.  Accordingly, the
District Court’s order denying the habeas
petition and vacating the order staying
Bamba’s deportation will be affirmed.
I.
Bamba is a native and citizen of the
Republic of the Ivory Coast.  He is the
husband of a U.S. citizen and has a son
who was born in the United States.  Bamba
originally entered the United States as a
visitor on July 1, 1987.1  In 1993, he
briefly left the United States for
approximately one month to visit his
family in the Ivory Coast. 
In 1995, Bamba again returned to
the Ivory Coast because of the death of his
mother.  Prior to his departure, Bamba
sought and received from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”)
advanced parole to re-enter the United
States upon his return.  Bamba was
paroled back into the United States on
October 25, 1995.2 
On December 24, 1997, Bamba was
charged in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
with one count of bank fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, for allegedly
transmitting two stolen checks in the
amounts of $10,055.13 and $14,792.52.
He subsequently pled guilty to an
Information on March 16, 1998, and was
sentenced on July 17, 1998, to time served,
three years of supervised release,3 and a
fine of $500.00.
On March 2, 2001, the INS
detained Bamba and placed him in
expedited removal proceedings.  On April
18, 2001,4 the INS issued a Final
Administrative Removal Order pursuant to
§ 238 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1228, finding by
“clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence” that Bamba was deportable as
    1 There is some discrepancy in the briefs
and record regarding the actual date of
entry.  The immigration court’s transcript
includes testimony suggesting dates of
both January 1, 1987, and July 1, 1987.
See App. Vol. II at 7.  The District Court
credited the July date.  For the purpose of
this appeal, any discrepancy in dates is
immaterial. 
    2  A “paroled” alien is one who is
temporarily permitted to remain in the
United States pending a decision regarding
his application for admission.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).  “In the context of an
alien’s initial entry, this amounts to
permission by the Attorney General for
ingress into the country but is not a formal
‘admission.’”  Chi Thon Ngo v. INS.,192
F.3d 390, 392 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). 
    3 The term of supervised release was
completed on June 10, 2001. 
    4 While both the briefs and the District
Court’s opinion provide a date of April 23,
2001, the INS’s order lists the date as
“April 18, 2001.” 
3an alien convicted of an aggravated felony
pursuant to INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ordering
Bamba removed. 
Bamba subsequently filed an
application for withholding of removal and
for relief under the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (“Convention Against
Torture”).  The INS asylum officer initially
denied his request; however, the matter
was referred to an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) who found Bamba’s fear was
sufficiently reasonable to allow him to
proceed with an application for
withholding and protection. 
Following a hearing on June 10,
2002, the IJ found Bamba ineligible for
withholding of removal or relief under the
Convention Against Torture.  The IJ noted
that Bamba was subject to expedited
removal following his conviction of the
“aggravated felony” of bank fraud in
which the loss involved was over $10,000.
The IJ determined, however, that although
the offense constituted an aggravated
felony, it “is still the type of offense which
would allow him to apply for withholding
of removal.”  App. Vol. II at 33.  Yet the IJ
went on to conclude that Bamba failed to
meet the standard necessary to establish
withholding of removal or relief under the
Convention Against Torture.
On November 6, 2002, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the
decision of the IJ.  The BIA agreed with
the IJ that Bamba failed to meet his burden
of proof for withholding eligibility or
protection under the Convention Against
Torture.   Moreover, the BIA rejected
Bamba’s contention that as a parolee he
should not have been placed in expedited
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b).  The BIA reasoned that
“[n]othing in that provision prohibits its
application to parolees, and construing the
provision to forbid its application to
parolees would provide more favorable
treatment for parolees than for lawfully
admitted aliens.”  App. Vol. II at 52 (citing
Baran-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.
2001) [sic]).  Finally, the BIA noted that it
did not have jurisdiction to consider
Bamba’s contention that 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b) violates his right to due process. 
On November 12, 2002, Bamba
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus in the
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241.   Bamba advanced two principal
arguments: (1) as a person paroled into the
United States, he is not “deportable” under
the expedited removal proceedings of 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b); and (2) even if he is
subject to expedited removal proceedings,
application of the statute in his case
violates his due process rights.  On appeal
before this Court, however, Bamba does
not challenge the statute as violative of due
process.  Therefore, we limit our
discussion to the issue of the statute’s
applicability to parolees.
The District Court rejected
Bamba’s argument that § 1228(b)’s
expedited removal proceedings are only
applicable to “admitted” aliens who are
convicted of an aggravated felony, and
4therefore as a parolee Bamba is not subject
to the provision.  Rather, the District
Court, relying on the language of the
statute and case law of other circuit courts,
concluded that the provision is applicable
to all aliens convicted of an aggravated
felony who are not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, including parolees.5
Notice of appeal was timely filed on
April 29, 2003.  This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  “We
review de novo the District Court’s denial
of habeas corpus relief and its
interpretation of the applicable statutes.”
Steele v. Blackman,  236 F.3d 130, 133
(3d Cir. 2001).  
For the reasons elaborated below,
we agree that the District Court properly
rejected Bamba’s interpretation of the
statute as being inapplicable to parolees.
Rather, the District Court’s conclusion that
the statute applies to aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony who are not lawfully
admitted for permanent residence is
supported by the plain language of the
statute, context and legislative history of
the INA, and case law of other circuit
courts. 
II.
“[T]he Immigration Act has never
been a model of clarity,” Chi Thon Ngo v.
INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394 (3d Cir. 1999), and
the provisions at issue in this case are no
exception.  Nevertheless, we conclude that
the better interpretation of the statute’s
plain language is that the expedited
removal proceedings apply to all aliens not
admitted for permanent residence,
including parolees such as Bamba, who are
convicted of an aggravated felony. 
8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) provides, in
pertinent part:
(b) Removal of aliens who
are not permanent residents
(1) The Attorney General
may, in the case of an alien
described in paragraph (2),
determine the deportability
of such alien under section
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of this
title (relating to conviction
of an aggravated felony) and
issue an order of removal
pursuant to the procedures
set forth in this subsection
or section 1229a of this title.
(2) An alien is described in
this paragraph if the alien—
(A) was not lawfully
admitted for permanent
    5 Bamba does not dispute the District
Court’s conclusion that (1) as a parolee he
was not “lawfully admitted” for permanent
residence in the United States at the time
expedited removal proceedings were
commenced against him, and (2) he was
convicted of an “aggravated felony” as
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Rather, as already noted, the only issue on
appeal is whether the District Court erred
in its interpretation of the statute. 
5residence at the time at
which proceedings under
this section commenced; or
(B) had permanent resident
status on a conditional basis
(as described in section
1186a of this title) at the
time that proceedings under
this section commenced.
8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (emphasis added).6  
Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides:
“Any alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.”  (emphasis
added). 
The District Court concluded that
the plain language of § 1228(b) and §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) dictates a conclusion
that the expedited removal provision
applies to all aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony who are not lawfully
admitted for permanent residence,
including parolees.  See Bamba v. Elwood,
No. 02-8430, at 11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2003).  The plain language of 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b) does appear to support this
interpretation.  Section 1228(b)(1) applies
“in the case of an alien described in
paragraph (2)” who is convicted of an
aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1),
and paragraph 2 describes such an alien as
one who “was not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence at the time at which
p r o c e e d in g s  u n der  th is  sec t io n
commenced,” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2).
The wrinkle, however, is that the
language of § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) arguably
suggests a contrary result.  In support of
his interpretation that § 1228(b) does not
apply to parolees, Bamba argues that §
1228(b)(1) expressly requires that the
“deportability” of an alien be determined
by 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which
provides that to be deportable an alien
must be “convicted of an aggravated
felony any time after admission.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
The District Court rejected
Bamba’s reading of the statute.  In
particular, the District Court expressed
concern that under Bamba’s interpretation
the statute would be rendered meaningless,
as no alien would qualify for expedited
removal proceedings.  “Expedited removal
under § 1228(b) is applicable only to
aliens not lawfully admitted who are
convicted of an aggravated felony.  If, as
petitioner argues, admission is required in
order to authorize expedited removal as an
aggravated felony, § 1228(b) would be a
nullity—no alien would qualify for
expedited removal.”  Bamba v. Elwood,
No. 02-8430, at 11 (Mar. 31, 2003).
Bamba contends that the District
Court erroneously concluded that his
    6 “The terms ‘admission’ and ‘admitted’
mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States
after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.”  8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13)(A).  “An alien who is paroled
under section 1182(d)(5) of this title . . .
shall not be considered to have been
admitted.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B).
6interpretation would render § 1228(b) a
nullity.  He argues that § 1228(b) actually
says that it applies to aliens who are “not
lawf ully admitted for permanent
residence,” and that there are many aliens
lawfully admitted for reasons other than
permanent residence.  Thus, under
Bamba’s interpretation, § 1228’s expedited
removal process would apply only to
admitted aliens who are not admitted for
permanent residence, such as visitors,
students, and temporary residents.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B),(F),(H),(L). 
While Bamba is correct that his
interpretation of the statute would not
literally render the expedited removal
proceeding a “nullity”—that is, the
provision would still apply in certain
circumstances—his interpretation would
still create the anomalous result that the
expedited removal proceedings would only
apply to a limited class of admitted aliens.
As the Government points out, such a
reading would create the perverse result
that hypothetical accomplices of Bamba
who had been admitted as students,
tourists, or another temporary class would
be subject to expedited removal, while
Bamba would not be subject to such
procedures precisely because he was not
legally admitted.7   
We reject such an illogical
interpretation of the statute.  Rather, we
agree with the Government and District
Court that the better reading of 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b)’s plain language is that it applies
to aliens convicted of an aggravated felony
who are not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.   
The Government’s interpretation is
easily reconcilable with the language of §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as incorporated in §
1228(b)(1).  Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)’s
    7 Bamba argues that the INA contains
two separa te expedited removal
proceedings—one for aliens who have not
been admitted, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and
one for aliens who have been admitted, 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b).  He argues that there are
cases where aliens who have not been
admitted, such as parolees, would receive
less favorable treatment.  For example,
Bamba argues, under § 1225(b), if a
paro lee i s  dete rmined  to  have
misrepresented a material fact, falsely
claimed U.S. citizenship, or lacks proper
documentation, he can be ordered removed
with no hearing or review.  See Appellant
Br. at 26.  
This argument is unpersuasive.  To
begin, the plain language of § 1225(b)
suggests that it is inapplicable to parolees.
Section 1225(b)(1) is entitled “Inspection
of aliens arriving in the United States and
certain other aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled.”  8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1) (emphasis added).  Even
assuming § 1225 does apply to parolees,
the mere fact that under Bamba’s
interpretation there may be a limited
number of circumstances where parolees
might be treated less favorably than
admitted aliens does not render appropriate
a construction of the statute that illogically
provides for generally better treatment to
parolees than admittees. 
7requirement that the alien must be
“convicted of an aggravated felony any
time after admission” is best read as
limiting the application of the expedited
removal proceedings to those aliens who
have committed an aggravated felony after
entering the United States.  In other words,
the word “admission” in this subparagraph
is not to be read as a term of art referring
to a class of aliens formally admitted, but
rather as clarifying that the statute does not
apply to aliens who have committed an
aggravated felony prior to entering this
country. 
We also disagree with Bamba’s
contention that his interpretation comports
with the plain meaning of the statute.  At
best, Bamba has established that the
statutory scheme is ambiguous.  To the
extent that the statute is silent or
ambiguous, we defer to the agency’s
interpretation and “the question for the
court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984); see also United States v.
Hernandez-Vermudez, 356 F.3d 1011,
1014 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that §
1228(b) is ambiguous and deferring to the
Attorney General’s interpretation).  It is
well-established that  “the BIA’s (and
hence the IJ’s) interpretation of the INA is
subject to established principles of
deference.” Coraggioso v. Ashcroft, 355
F.3d 730, 733 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing INS v.
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25
(1999)).  This includes affording Chevron
deference to BIA decisions “giv[ing]
ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case
adjudication.’” Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.
at 425 (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987)); see also Acosta
v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir.
2003).
In this case, in affirming the IJ’s
decision, the BIA interpreted § 1228(b) as
applying to parolees such as Bamba:
“Nothing in that provision prohibits its
application to parolees, and construing the
provision to forbid its application to
parolees would provide more favorable
treatment for parolees than for lawfully
admitted aliens.”  App. Vol. II, at 53
(citing Baran-Reyes [sic]).  As elaborated
above, we believe that this is a
“permissible construction of the statute.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
Moreover, regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General implicitly support
an interpretation of § 1228(b) as applying
to parolees.  Congress has delegated
authority to the Attorney General to
promulgate regulations for proceedings
under § 1228(b).  See 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b )(4); see also Hernandez-
Vermudez, 356 F.3d at 1015-16.  In
Hernandez-Vermudez, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the Attorney General has
enacted regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 238.1,
providing for the application of § 1228(b)
to aliens who are not admitted or paroled.
Hernandez-Vermudez, 356 F.3d at 1015 &
n.6 (deferring to regulation in concluding
that § 1228(b) expedited removal
proceeding applies to illegal immigrants).
While the regulation is arguably not
8directly applicable in this case because it
applies to aliens who are not admitted or
paroled, the language of the regulation
suggests that the Attorney General has
interpreted “deportable” to include
“paroled” aliens.  The regulation provides,
in pertinent part: 
PART 238—EXPEDITED
R E M O V A L  O F
AGGRAVATED FELONS
. . . .
( b )  P r e l i m i n a r y
consideration and Notice of




(1) Basis of Service charge.
An issuing Service officer
shall cause to be served
upon an alien a Form I-851,
Notice of Intent to Issue a
F i n a l  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e
Deportation Order (Notice
of Intent), if the officer is
satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence, based
upon questioning of the
alien by an immigration
officer and upon any other
evidence obtaine d, to
support a finding that the
individual:
(i) Is an alien;
(ii) Has not been lawfully
admitted for permanent
residence, or has conditional
permanent resident status
under section 216 of the
Act;
(iii) Has been convicted (as
d e f i n e d  i n  s e c t i o n
101(a)(48) of the Act and as
demonstrated by any of the
documents or records listed
in § 3.41 of this chapter) of
an aggravated felony and
such conviction has become
final; and
(iv) Is deportable under
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of
the Act, including an alien
who has neither been
admitted nor paroled, but
w h o  i s  c o n c l u si v e ly
presumed deportable under
section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) by
operation of section 238(c)
of the Act (“Presumption of
Deportability”).
8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (emphasis added).  The
use of the phrase “including an alien who
has neither been admitted nor paroled”
(emphasis added) implicitly suggests an
interpretation of “deportable” under INA §
2 3 7 ( a ) (2 ) ( A ) ( i i i ) ,  8  U . S . C .  §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), that includes paroled
aliens. 
In sum, we read the plain language
of § 1228(b) to apply to parolees.  To the
extent the statute is ambiguous, we defer
to the BIA’s interpretation, as outlined in
the BIA’s decision in this case and
implicitly in 8 C.F.R. § 238.1, that §
1228(b)’s expedited removal proceedings
9apply to parolees. 
III. 
The legislative history and
framework of the INA further bolsters our
interpretation of the statute.  Admittedly, a
review of the legislative history does not
reveal Congress’s specific intent with
respect to the application of § 1228(b) to
parolees.  However, the legislative history
does evince a broad Congressional intent
to expedite the removal of criminal aliens.
“[I]t is beyond cavil that one of Congress’s
principal goals in enacting [the Illegal
Immigration Reform Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div.
C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)] was to
expedite the removal of aliens who have
been convicted of aggravated felonies.”
Zhang v. INS, 274 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir.
2001) (citing Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d
919, 925 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also
Hernandez-Vermudez, 356 F.3d at 1014
(“Congress clearly intended to expedite the
removal of criminal aliens who are not
l a w f u l  p e r m a n e n t  r e s i d e n t s . ” ) .
“Sometimes legislative history is itself
ambiguous.  Not this time.  There simply is
no denying that in enacting the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994,8 and [IIRIRA],9 Congress
intended to expedite the removal of
criminal aliens.”  Hernandez-Vermudez,
356 F.3d at 1014 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 104-828, at 215 (1996); H.R. Rep. No.
104-469(I), at 12, 107, 118-25 (1996)).
Bamba’s interpretation of the statute as
applying to only a narrow class of admitted
aliens is inconsistent with this broad
Congressional intent to expedite the
removal of criminal aliens.  Cf. Zhang,
274 F.3d at 108 (holding in context of 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) that “[i]n light of
that goal [of expediting the removal of
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies],
we think it is unlikely that Congress meant
to deny judicial review of removal orders
only for aliens who had been lawfully
admitted to the United States and to allow
such review for aggravated felons who had
never been admitted”).  Moreover,
Congress’s intent to apply the expedited
proceedings to all aliens who are not
lawfully admitted as permanent residents,
including parolees, is reflected in § 1228’s
title—“Removal of Aliens Who Are Not
Permanent Residents.”10  
    8 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XIII, §
130004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2026-28 (1994).
    9 IIRIRA § 304(c), Pub. L. No. 104-208,
Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-597 (1996).
    10 We acknowledge that “the title of a
statute . . .  cannot limit the plain meaning
of the text.” Brotherhood of R. R.
Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331
U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947); see also
Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 235 (3d
Cir. 1999) (explaining that “a title alone is
not controlling”).  However, a title can be
examined “[f]or interpretive purposes . . .
[to] shed light on some ambiguous word or
phrase.”  331 U.S. at 529.  In this case, to
the extent that the class of aliens covered
by § 1228’s expedited removal provision is
10
Bamba contends that the framework
of the INA supports his interpretation of 8
U.S.C. § 1228(b).  Specifically, he points
to the fact while IIRIRA united the
bifurcated “exclusion” and “deportation”
proceedings into a single “removal”
proceeding, see Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360
F.3d 414, 415 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004),  the Act
still maintains some distinctions between
aliens who have been admitted and are
“deportable” and those aliens who have
not been admitted and are “inadmissible.”
See Appellant Br. at 12-14 (citing, e.g., In
re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I & N Dec. 616
(BIA 1999); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2)).11
Bamba therefore argues that because
Congress used the term “deportability” and
not “inadmissibility” or “deportation and
inadmissibility,” it must be presumed that
Congress specifically intended § 1228(b)’s
expedi ted adm inistrative  removal
proceedings to apply only to “deportable”
aliens, and not paroled aliens like Bamba
who have not been “admitted.”  
The problem, however, is that
Bamba advances no rationale for why
Congress would have intended to preserve
a distinction between “deportable” and
“inadmissible” aliens in the context of
expedited removal of aggravated felons.
As elaborated above, any such distinction
is irrational, applying a less stringent
standard to those aliens who have not been
admitted.  Moreover, Bamba’s argument
fails to acknowledge the existence of other
language in § 1228(b) indicating that the
provision was intended to apply to
inadmissible aliens.  Recall that the
provision explicitly provides that “[a]n
alien is described in this paragraph if the
alien—(A) was not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
IV.
While our Court has not previously
addressed the issue in this case, other
circuit courts considering the question
have uniformly concluded that § 1228’s
expedited removal provision applies to all
aliens not admitted for permanent
residence, including parolees. 
As noted by the District Court, in
Bazan-Reyes v. INS the Seventh Circuit
considered and rejected precisely the same
argument that Bamba now advances.  256
F.3d 600, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2001).  In
support of its interpretation of § 1228(b),
the Seventh Circuit explained:
ambiguous, we find it persuasive that
Congress entitled the section “Removal of
Aliens Who Are Not Permanent
Residents.”  8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (emphasis
added). 
    11 For example, while the alien has the
burden in an application for admission of
establishing that he is “clearly and beyond
doubt entitled to be admitted and is not
inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A),
the government has “the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that, in the case of an alien who
has been admitted to the United States, the
alien is deportable,” 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(3)(A). 
11
Nothing in that section
prohibits its application to
parolees, and, as the
government points out,
construing the statute to
forbid its application to
parolees would provide
more favorable treatment for
parolees than for lawfully
admitted aliens.  We cannot
believe that Congress
intended such a result.  We
find it more plausible that
t h e  r e f e r e n c e  to  §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) simply
operates to incorporate the
definition of aggravated
felony set out in that section
to elucidate which non-
lawful resident aliens may
be placed in expedited
proceedings.
Id. at 605.12
In a slightly different context, the
Ninth Circuit has recently joined the
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit,
rejecting the argument that immigrants
who are not “admitted” are exempt from §
1228(b)’s expedited removal of aggravated
felons.  See Hernandez-Vermudez, 356
F.3d 1011.13  While acknowledging that
the statute “can be read” to exempt aliens
who are not admitted, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that such a reading is at odds
with the language and the legislative
history of the statute.  See id. at 1014.14   
Bamba points to no authority from
    12 Bamba’s attempt to distinguish
Bazan-Reyes on the ground that it has
been overruled by subsequent Seventh
Circuit case law is unpersuasive.  The case
cited by Bamba in support of this
proposition—Dimenski v. INS, 275 F.3d
574 (7 th Cir. 2001)—not only does not
explicitly overrule Bazan-Reyes but is
based on immigration law prior to the
enactment of IIRIRA.
    13 In Hernandez-Vermudez, the Ninth
Circuit examined the meaning of the
statute in the context of a claim that an
illegal immigrant, rather than a parolee,
was exempt from the expedited removal
provision because he was not “admitted.”
The analysis with respect to interpretation
of the statutory scheme, however, is
equally persuasive in the context of
parolees.
    14  The position of the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits is also supported by the
Second  Circuit’s decision in Zhang v.
INS.  In Zhang, the court examined the
scope of § 1225(a)(2)(C)’s  jurisdiction-
stripping provision for aggravated felons.
The appellant argued, as here, that
§ 1 2 2 5 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( C ) ’ s  r e f e r e n ce  t o
§ 1 2 2 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( A ) ( i i i )  l i m i t e d  t h e
ju r i s d ic t i o n -s t r ip p i n g  p r o v i s io n ’s
application to aliens who were admitted.
The court rejected this interpretation.  274
F.3d at 107-08.  Rather, the Second Circuit
concluded that the reference was included
“not for its description of persons but
solely for its cataloguing of crimes.”  Id. at
108.
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other circuit courts suggesting a contrary
interpretation of the statute.  We now join
the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
in Bazan-Reyes and the Ninth Circuit in
Hernandez-Vermudez, and hold that §
1228(b)’s expedited removal provision is
applicable to all aliens convicted of an
aggravated felony who are not lawfully
admitted for permanent residence,
including parolees.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the District Court’s order denying
the habeas petition and vacating the order
staying Bamba’s deportation.  
